Voting Theory



pp

Topics
Bibliography


Topics

The course will consist of two parts. In the first one we will review the basic concepts of social choice theory, different voting systems, Arrow's impossibility theorem and its consequences, the geometry of voting and extensions of the median voter theorem in many dimensionals situations. It shall be assumed that agents sincerely reveal their preferences.

 In the second one we will study what happens when agents vote strategically, not necessarily revealing their preferences. Applications will include abstention theory, voting in commitee and shareholders assemblies and deviations from Condorcet's theorem.


Bibiliography:

Book


Mueller, D. , "Public choice", Cambridge University Press, 2003


Papers on "Naive" Voting

S,Nitzan,P.Paroush,"Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations,"
International Economic Review, vol. 23(2), pages 289-97,

McKelvey, Richard D., 1976."Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June.

Greenberg, Joseph, 1979."Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 627-36, May.

L Shapley, B Grofman, Optimizing group judgmental accuracy in the presence of interdependencies - Public Choice, 1984.

Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988. "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July.


Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1998. "Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis,"
 American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 139-56, March.



On Strategic voting and Applications

Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996."Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts,"

Timothy Feddersen & Alvaro Sandroni,
2006."A Theory of Participation in Elections,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1271-1282, September.
Feddersen, Timothy J & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996. "The Swing Voter's Curse," 
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 408-24, June.

Stefano Demichelis, Amrita Dhillon : "Learning and voters' turnout in equilibrium".

Stefano Demichelis & Klaus Ritzberger, 2007. "Corporate Control and the Stock Market"
Laslier, Jean-François & Weibull, Jörgen, 2008. "Commitee decisions: optimality and equilibrium,"
Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 692, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 11 Mar 2008.


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